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Abstract: 
The purpose of this study is to analyze Australian Muslims‟ awareness of profit-and- 
loss sharing financial instruments. A sample of 300 Australian Muslims was  surveyed. 
The survey utilized a short questionnaire containing specific questions relating to the 
willingness of respondents to purchase profit-and-loss sharing Islamic banking 
products. The results indicate that the majority of the Australian Muslim population 
sample would be willing to purchase Islamic banking products, but are not properly 
informed about profit-and-loss sharing instruments. The results further hint towards a 
lack of understanding of the principles of Islamic finance. This  was  deduced from the 
fact that a section of the population stated that they would not be willing to purchase 
Islamic banking products if credit facilities were not available, or  if the banks shared 
losses as well as profits. 
 
Keywords: Islamic financing, interest-free financing, profit-and-loss sharing, 
Australia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of interest-free financing was practiced by Arabs prior to the advent of 
Islam, and was later adopted by Muslims as an acceptable form of trade financing. 
While the system had been used on a small-scale for centuries, its commercial 
application began in the 1970‟s.
1 
Since then Islamic financing has experienced 
worldwide acceptance, and by early 2003 there were at least 176  Islamic  banks around 
the world, with deposits in excess of $147 billion.
2
 
 
While Islamic financing has become popular in both Muslim and Non-Muslim 
countries, the system has not achieved wide spread success among Muslims in 
Australia. The main reason for this has been the lack of awareness about the  principles 
of the system among the population.
3
 
 
Australia‟s Muslim population is increasing at a rapid pace, and based on the 
requirement of Shari’ah
i
, one would expect an increase in demand for Islamic financial 
products. This has certainly been true in the case of other Non-Muslim majority nations 
like the UK, where the increase in demand for Islamic products has convinced bank 
regulators to provide permission for the operation of a purely Islamic Bank.
4 
According 
to the Census of the population conducted in 2001, there are more than 281,000 Muslim 
in Australia, which is equivalent to 1.5 percent of the total Australian population. This 
marks an increase of 40 percent in the Muslim population since the previous census was 
conducted in 1996.
5
 
 
Australia‟s experience with Islamic financing has been relatively recent. The first 
attempt to introduce Islamic financing products in Australia was made by the Muslim 
Community Co-operative Australia (MCCA).
6 
The organization began in 1989 with 
AU$22,300 worth of seeding capital and by 2003 had 5,600 members and deposits 
worth AU$24 million.
7 
Majority of the MCCA members are from Melbourne and 
Sydney where the organization has a physical presence. In 2001 another organization, 
Iskan Finance, started providing Shari’ah compliant home financing options.
8
 
The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the awareness of, and demand for profit-and- 
loss sharing Islamic financial products in Australia among the practicing Muslim 
population. This would represent the most likely purchasers of Islamic banking 
products in a country with a minority Muslim population. The paper is divided into five 
sections. Section two provides a brief overview of the Islamic financing system, 
followed by section three which details the methodology used for this study. Section 
four reports on the findings and implications of this study, while the final section 
provides suggestions for further studies. 
 
THE ISLAMIC FINANCING SYSTEM 
Islamic financing is based upon the principle that the use of Riba (interest) is 
prohibited.
9 
This prohibition is based upon Shari’ah ruling. Since Muslims cannot 
receive or pay interest, they are unable to conduct business with conventional banks.
10
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To service this niche market, Islamic financial institutions have developed a range of 
halal
ii 
interest-free financing instruments that conform to Shari’ah ruling, and therefore 
are acceptable to their clients.
11
 
 
The idea of Islamic banking goes back to as early as the seventh century, but it was only 
commercially implemented in the last century.
12 
As the end of the colonial era 
approached, some of the newly formed and independent Muslim states reassessed  their 
economic policies on the basis of Shari’ah principles. This marked  the  beginning of 
the present-day revival of  Islamic  finance.   Small scale limited    scope 
interest-free institutions were unsuccessfully tried in the mid 1940‟s in Malaysia and 
1950‟s in Pakistan.
13 
From 1946 onwards, research by Muslim scholars gradually 
produced principles for banking practices that were likely to be acceptable to the 
banking and Islamic communities. The first successful application of Islamic finance 
was undertaken in 1963 by Egypt‟s Mit Ghamr Savings Bank, which earned its income 
from profit-sharing investments rather than from interest.
14 
By the 1970‟s, the push for 
Islamic finance had gained momentum. In 1973 the conference of foreign ministers of 
Muslim countries decided to establish the Islamic Development Bank with the aim of 
fostering economic development and social progress of Muslim countries in accordance 
with the principles of Shari’ah.
15 
This marked the first major collective step taken by 
Muslim countries to promote Islamic finance. 
 
The market leaders in this industry are Citigroup, HSBC, J.P. Morgan, and Standard 
Chartered who provide Islamic financing products through the use of  Islamic windows 
(special facilities offered by conventional banks to provide services to Muslims who 
wish to engage in Islamic banking).
16 
While a number of Islamic financial  products  are  
now  available,  the  most  widely  recognized  profit-and-loss 
sharing instruments are Mudaraba (finance trusteeship) and Musharaka (equity 
partnership). Mudaraba is an agreement between two parties, where one provides 
finance to another for utilisation in an agreed manner.
17 
The financier of the venture is 
known as the Rabb-ul-mal, and the entrepreneur responsible for the management and 
execution  of the project  is  referred  to  as  the  Mudarib.   The parties achieve    their 
returns by sharing in the profits of the venture, which are divided on a proportional 
basis. Under a Mudaraba agreement, returns cannot be provided as a lump sum, and 
cannot be guaranteed. To fulfill the requirements of this contract the parties must decide 
on a rate for sharing of the profits prior to the commencement of the business activity. 
After the business is completed the financier receives the principal and the pre-agreed  
share  of  the  profit.  The  remainder  of  the  profit  is  the entrepreneur‟s 
compensation for their ideas and services.
13
 
 
The other profit-and-loss sharing instrument is Musharaka which refers to a joint 
partnership formed for conducting business in which all partners share the profit 
according to a specific ratio while the loss is shared according to the ratio of the 
contribution.
14,18,19,20
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The two profit-and-loss sharing instruments described above are the oldest form of 
interest-free financing found in ancient Arabia. Prior to the advent of Islam, wealthy 
Arab merchants financed the caravan trade and would share in the profits of a successful 
operation but could also lose all or part of their investment, if, for example, the 
merchandise was stolen, lost or sold for less than its cost.
21   
After the  introduction 
of Islam, this system was permitted to continue and was legitimatized as a finance 
instrument. For this historical reason, scholars consider profit-and-loss sharing financial 
instruments to be the most authentic and most promising form of Islamic contracts.
22 
Yet, partly due to the high risk involved, while the Islamic Banks are expected to grow 
at an annual rate of around fifteen percent, profit-and-loss sharing constitutes only a 
small part (about five percent) of their activities.
23 
To ensure that Islamic financing 
continues to follow the concept of linking returns to risks, many scholars have argued 
for a greater use of the profit-and-loss sharing products.
19,22 
Achieving this requires a 
deeper understanding and acceptance by the Muslim population of the principles of 
profit-and-loss sharing financing and the available alternatives. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
As the main focus of this paper is to examine the level of perceived awareness of  halal 
banking among Muslim residents in Australia, a short questionnaire was formed 
containing specific questions relating to the willingness of respondents to purchase 
Islamic banking products. Also, questions were picked to distinguish between 
respondents that believe they were well informed about profit-and-loss sharing 
agreements, and those who had previously owned (or currently own) a halal stylized 
banking product. 
 
Originally, a pilot study was carried out utilizing a host of questions on a small  sample 
of individuals. These questions were conditional in nature and were used to determine 
the selection of sample population. The next step was to develop a short questionnaire 
that would be easy to understand and require minimal time to complete, six specific 
questions were chosen that; (a) provided maximum coverage of the research questions 
we were interested in answering; and (b) were not co-related questions. Specifically, 
this second point deals with the need for most questionnaires that ask a multitude of 
questions to undertake factor analysis to determine the relative groupings that constitute 
the framework of the questionnaire. Sometimes, however, factor analysis fails in as 
much as a subjective element is incorporated into this methodology in setting the 
appropriate number of latent factors inherent within the data. To avoid this issue, 
questions that were chosen were specifically selected to ensure the correlations between 
the variables were low, thereby ensuring each  variable specifically targeted a question 
that could not easily be proxied by another. 
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The questionnaires were distributed simultaneously by 3 trained
iii 
administrators to 300 
respondents after Friday prayers at 3 different mosques during June 2004 in the city of 
Adelaide, Australia. The number of people available for the survey was far greater, but 
only those people meeting specific selection criteria were asked to complete the six 
questions. The selection criteria was devised to ensure only those people who (a) came 
from a Muslim background, and were practicing Muslims, (b) currently owned a bank 
account in Australia, (c) were interested in halal banking products, and (d) gainfully 
employed were selected (18 years and over). By default, 89% of the respondents were 
male. This led to a sample dataset of respondents with highly specific demographics. 
Our dataset therefore analyses the awareness and willingness of this specific cohort of 
the population for undertaking halal accounts. This cohort also represents the 
demographic of most likely people any profit and loss sharing account would be 
catering for and so provides an interesting study on how well halal banking practices 
would sell under current informational conditions. 
 
The results tabulated in the succeeding empirical section show cross-tabulations of how 
the respondents‟ answers were dependent on their perceived knowledge of halal style 
banking, plus prior experience with these products. Also, results from a logit model are 
presented, showing the significance of how respondents‟ familiarity with halal banking 
influenced their willingness to purchase halal banking products under various 
conditions. The logit model is a maximum likelihood regression where the dependent 
variable is a binary variable (yes=1 or no=0 answers). A standard linear regression 
would not be suitable, as the conditional mean equation would place unsuitable 
assumptions on the residuals of the model, as now the dependent variable can only vary 
between 0 and 1. Instead, we model the probability of observing a  value of 1 as a 
function of F, which is a continuous, increasing distribution that  returns a value ranging 
from zero to one. Specifically, for a latent variable yi that is linearly related to x, then 
the logit regression of: 
 
y x
' u where  ui  is  random  noise  and  ß  is  a  vector  of  coefficients for the 
independent variables, the probability of obtaining a one can be written as: 
 
Pr(y 1 \ x, ) 1F(x
' ) 1(ex /(1ex )) (1) 
i i 
i i 
 
where F is now a cumulative distribution function for the logistic distribution. The main 
difference with this type of regression and normal ordinary least squares regressions is 
that the coefficients of the explanatory variables do not show the marginal effect on the 
dependent variable. The sign and significance values attributed to the coefficients 
remain, however, the same. For example, the more positive a variable is, the greater the 
probability of a positive value being attributed to the dependent variable. 
i 
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To provide a goodness-of-fit test for the above maximum likelihood regression, the 
Andrews (1988)
24 

2 
test is performed for each  regression.  It  tests  to  compare the fitted 
expected values to the actual values by specific groups. If the differences are 
significantly large, it indicates we should reject the model as producing a good fit to the 
actual data. Therefore, the null hypothesis is that the model is a good fit, with the 
alternative being that it isn‟t. Standard Akaike and Log likelihood values are also 
reported. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Generalized Results and Contingency Tables 
Table 1, below, shows the generalized answers to the six specific questions that were 
asked. It is interesting to note that from the outset, their perceived awareness of halal 
banking practices (profit and loss sharing agreements) amongst the selected pool of 
respondents is not particularly high, at 55.7%. Even more so are the numbers of persons 
having previously held (or are holding) a halal stylized bank account, making up only 
19.3% of those interviewed. This is probably largely due to the lack of  Islamic banking 
products in Australia in general. 
 
Table 1. Proportional Responses to Survey Queries. 
Query Yes No N/A 
Awareness of halal banking products 55.7% 44.1% 0.3% 
Ever having held a halal stylized bank account 19.3% 80.1% 0.7% 
Willingness to switch to a halal product given same quality of 
conventional banking service (ATM, online access, phone banking) 
92.5% 7.4% 1.5% 
Willingness to switch without credit facilities 79.0% 20.9% 0% 
Willing to switch to a profit-and-loss agreement where you might incur 
losses 
60.8% 37.9% 3.3% 
Willingness to switch dependent on brand recognition 60.1% 39.7% 0.3% 
Responses are quoted in percentage terms with N/A representing the proportion of missing responses for 
a particular question. 
 
Surprisingly, the lack of knowledge and experience with utilizing halal bank products 
does not seem, at the face of it, to be a detriment to the willingness for people to 
purchase a halal bank account if the same facilities were available to them as that 
currently offered by the mainstream conventional banks. In fact, 92.5% of the 
respondents were keen to be part of a profit-and-loss sharing arrangement. If we take  a 
look at tables 2 and 3 we can also break this figure up between those that answered yes 
to those answering no to having said they are aware of halal banking. The difference in 
the response they give is independent of how aware they believe they are of halal profit-
and-loss sharing agreements, with 94% and 90.8% of the respondents answering 
positively to purchasing a halal product regardless of whether they believe they are 
familiar with halal practices or not, respectively. A simple Pearson Chi- square test on 
the independence between the two questions results in a test statistic of 0.952 and 
probability value rejecting the null hypothesis of independence at 30.9%, indicating 
these two factors are indeed statistically independent of each other. 
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One important point to highlight is that what the respondents consider awareness of 
profit-and-loss sharing agreements are not necessarily translated into the willingness  to 
purchase a halal product if explicit consideration is made that losses are a real 
possibility. For example, even though 94% of the respondents who answered yes to 
being aware of halal banking products said they were keen to take out a profit and  loss 
sharing product, 21.9% said they would not be interested if credit facilities were not 
available and 34.3% would not if they might incur a loss. These results highlight an 
important facet of the data, which is that the respondents perceived knowledge of halal 
banking practices are not necessarily in alignment with some of the more basic 
principles of Islamic banking, namely the inability to obtain credit (interest-charged) 
and possibility of experiencing a loss on a profit and loss sharing account.  However,  it 
is also important to point out that those who answered no to being aware of halal profit 
and loss sharing practices, were also even less keen to buy a product if losses could 
occur (44.7%). A Pearson Chi-Square test reveals there is a dependent relationship 
between the two sets of queries at the 10% significance level (with a Chi- square statistic 
of 3.04). 
 
 
Table 2. Positive conditional responses to specific queries. 
Query Having held a halal 
product 
Aware of halal 
banking products 
Awareness of halal 
products and 
willing to switch 
given conventional 
bank service 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Willingness to switch to a halal 
product given same quality of 
conventional banking service 
(ATM, online access, phone 
banking) 
77.0% 23.0% 94.0% 6.0% - - 
Willingness to switch without credit 
facilities 
76.9% 23.1% 78.1% 21.9% 82.7% 17.3% 
Willing to switch to a profit-and- 
loss agreement where you might 
incur losses 
77.0% 23.0% 65.7% 34.3% 70.3% 29.6% 
Willingness to switch dependent on 
brand recognition 
67.4% 32.6% 67.3% 32.7% 66.9% 33.1% 
This table displays cross-tabulations for all affirmative (Yes) responses made to each specific query 
listed in the first column to subsequent queries asked to these same respondents in the first row. 
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Table 3. Negative conditional responses to specific queries. 
Query Having held a halal 
product 
Aware of halal 
banking products 
Awareness of halal 
products and 
willing to switch 
given conventional 
bank service 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Willingness to switch to a halal 
product given same quality of 
conventional banking service 
(ATM, online access, phone 
banking) 
56.6% 43.3% 90.8% 9.2% - - 
Willingness to switch without credit 
facilities 
79.4% 20.6% 80.8% 19.2% 82% 18% 
Willing to switch to a profit-and- 
loss agreement where you might 
incur losses 
56.6% 43.3% 55.1% 44.7% 27.7% 72% 
Willingness to switch dependent on 
brand recognition 
58.0% 41.9% 37.7% 54.6% 55% 45% 
This table displays cross-tabulations for all negative (No) responses made to each specific query listed 
in the first column to subsequent queries asked to these same respondents in the first row. 
 
Following on from this, respondents who indicated that they had prior experience in 
having held a halal banking product before were more likely to be willing to hold a 
profit and loss sharing account, regardless of whether losses were a possibility (77%). 
However, having held a halal banking product is not a direct indicator of the willingness 
to purchase profit and loss sharing products. Respondents who answered no to either 
having owned a halal product before or even claim to be aware of halal practices are 
actually far more likely to be willing to purchase profit and loss sharing products even 
if credit facilities are not available (80.8%). 
 
Regression Results 
Before examining the regression results tabulated in table 5, it is necessary to briefly 
comment on the cross-correlations presented in table 4. First, this table shows that none 
of the specified equations have a large correlation with any of the other questions, 
removing the problem of multicollinearity prevalent in many survey  studies. Also, it is 
probably worthwhile spending some time looking at a few  particular correlations. To 
begin, and although one would expect a high correlation to exist between those that 
stated they had owned a halal bank account and whether they claim to be aware of halal 
profit-and-loss sharing practices, the actual answer is, surprisingly, no. The correlation 
between the two is only 0.36. This provides an indication that those who have or do 
hold halal banking products are perhaps more willing to acknowledge their own lack 
of awareness of the actual products, probably because they have had to actually deal 
with them. It also indicates that a large pool of those answering that they are aware of 
halal banking, have actually had no experience with any of the products. 
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Table 4. Cross correlations. 
 Awareness 
of halal 
banking 
products 
Ever having 
held a halal 
stylized bank 
account 
Willingness to 
switch to a halal 
product given 
same quality of 
conventional 
banking service 
Willingness 
to switch 
without credit 
facilities 
Willing to switch 
to a profit-and-loss 
agreement where 
you might incur 
losses 
Willingness 
to switch 
dependent 
on brand 
recognition 
Awareness of halal banking 
products 
1.00      
Ever having held a halal 
stylized bank account 
0.36 1.00     
Willingness to switch to a 
halal product given same 
quality of conventional 
banking service 
 
0.06 
 
0.03 
 
1.00 
   
Willingness to switch without 
credit facilities 
-0.02 0.01 0.42 1.00   
Willing to switch to a profit- 
and-loss agreement where 
you might incur losses 
 
0.11 
 
0.18 
 
0.24 
 
0.23 
 
1.00 
 
Willingness to switch 
dependent on brand 
recognition 
 
0.17 
 
0.08 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.11 
 
0.02 
 
1.00 
The values in the table represent correlation coefficients between each query listed in the first column 
with those queries in the first row. 
 
Examining now the actual logit regression results, the statistics reveal an interesting 
picture on the willingness of the respondents to purchase Profit-and-loss sharing. It 
should also be noted that one of the regressions only fails the Andrews goodness-of-fit 
test at the 10% significance level. 
 
Table 5. Logit Regression Results. 
Dependent variable 
Explanatory Variables Query 6 Query 7 
Awareness of halal banking products 0.2085 
(0.2905) 
0.6520
b 
(0.2784) 
Ever having held a halal stylized bank account 1.0581
b 
(0.4200) 
0.1400 
(0.3669) 
Willingness to switch to a halal product given same quality of 
conventional banking service 
1.4981
b 
(0.6285) 
0.3225 
(0.5511) 
Willingness to switch without credit facilities 0.9077
b 
(0.3585) 
-0.7304
c 
(0.3828) 
Willing to switch to a profit-and-loss agreement where you 
might incur losses 
- 0.1061 
(0.2817) 
Willingness to switch dependent on brand recognition 0.1095 
(0.2822) 
- 
Constant -1.9898
a 
(0.6359) 
0.2322 
(0.4859) 
Akaike info criterion 1.2569 1.3506 
Log likelihood -156.7798 -168.9135 
Andrews Statistic: 15.4268 
(0.1173) 
16.3331
c 
(0.0905) 
a Indicates significance at the 1% critical level, b indicates significance at the 5% critical level and c at the 10% critical 
level. 
Query 6 asks the question “Are you willing to switch to a profit-and-loss agreement where you might incur losses” 
Query 7 asks the question “Would your decision to switch to a profit-and-loss sharing agreement be affected if the 
bank providing these services was well established (brand-recognition important)? 
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Focusing in more detail on the first regression, it examines the possible determinants 
for a respondent to answer yes to being willing to buy a profit-and-loss  sharing product 
despite possibly incurring losses, based on how they answered the other questions. As 
a compliment to the cross-correlations and the contingency tables already discussed, we 
are now able to examine the dynamic relationship these questions share in leading to 
this specific query response. Of all the questions, only  the questions querying the 
respondents awareness of halal banking products and whether brand recognition is an 
important factor are not significant variables in determining whether the respondent 
answers yes to being willing to purchase a Profit- and-loss sharing account, despite 
incurring losses. This brings to the fore one very interesting matter; perceived 
awareness is not a strong determinant, at least for the case of purchasing profit-and-loss 
sharing products that might experience losses. Although this was briefly discussed 
before, when analyzing the contingency tables, in this regression framework it also 
highlights the insignificance of the variable, relative to the other questions that were 
asked. 
 
Following on from the above, the second regression places brand recognition as the 
dependent variable against all the other questions. In this case, only those people who 
perceive themselves as being aware of halal banking products is a significant 
determinant at the 5% critical level. At the 10% significance level, those respondents 
still willing to purchase Profit-and-loss sharing accounts despite not having access to 
credit, are also statistically more likely to believe brand recognition is important. For 
the remainder of the questions, their impact on determining whether brand recognition 
is important is not significant. Whether respondents have previously held halal 
products, for example, or their interest in ensuring the same level of service as offered 
by other conventional banks seems to bare little impact on how important brand 
recognition is. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
The findings indicate that the population would be receptive to the idea of purchasing 
Islamic financial products as long as the organization that is providing the service is 
well known, and benefits such as ATM access, phone banking and so on, are  provided. 
This provides a great opportunity for Australian financial institutions. If Australian 
organizations can build on their experience and reputation in the financial world, and 
can provide Islamic financial products in Australia, they can aim to gain a growing 
customer base of the Muslim population, some of who may have previously stayed 
away from dealing with the conventional financial institutions due to the use of interest. 
The Muslim Community Co-Operative Australia (MCCA) has led the way in the 
Australian market. From humble beginnings in Melbourne where the brand was 
unknown, the organization now has a large market share and continues to   experience 
strong growth.
6   
However, popular conventional banks such as the Australia and  New 
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Zealand Bank (ANZ) should aim for even faster growth due to the high customer 
confidence in their brand name, and their ability to promote new products. 
 
The findings also highlighted the lack of awareness in regards to the basic rules and 
principles of Islamic financing. The results indicate that a number of respondents would 
not take up halal financing options if credit facilities were taken away. In the Islamic 
financial system money is not lent out, instead its an asset-backed system where 
financial institutions invest in projects.
13 
Therefore, financial institutions deal  in equity, 
not debt.
25 
Providing credit facilities contravenes this principle. To counter this 
limitation, some financial institutions have started issuing „debit‟ cards. These cards 
are similar to the credit cards except for the fact that they use the client‟s own funds 
instead of reliance on any credit. 
 
Another issue is that of sharing profits and not losses. The results of the survey indicate 
that a number of respondents who had held a halal banking product were not aware of 
the loss sharing concept. This would indicate that some financial institutions have been 
guaranteeing profits. This contravenes the basic law of  Islamic finance,  that is, linking 
rewards to risk. Gains made on investment without risk is merely interest rather than 
profit. 
 
In order to understand how the Islamic system differentiates between profit and interest, 
one has to look at the differences in economic ideology. In capitalist theory, capital and 
entrepreneurs are treated as two separate factors of production where the former gets 
interest and the latter is entitled to profit. It is assumed that interest is a fixed return for 
providing capital, and profit can only be earned after distributing the fixed return to 
land, labor and capital (in the form of rent, wage and interest). In contrast, the Islamic 
economic system does not consider capital and entrepreneurs   as 
separate factors of production.
23   
It believes that every person who contributes  capital 
in the form of money to a business venture assumes the risk of loss and therefore is 
entitled to a proportional share in the actual profit.
26 
The system is protective of the 
entrepreneur, who in a capitalist economy would have to make fixed interest 
repayments even when the venture is making a loss.
20 
Capital has an intrinsic element 
of entrepreneurship, so far as the risk of the business is concerned and therefore, instead 
of a fixed return as interest, it derives profit. The more the profit of the business, the 
higher the return on capital. With no fixed interest repayments,  the  profit would be 
higher. In this way the profits generated by the commercial activities in the society are 
equally distributed amongst those who have contributed capital to 
the enterprise. 
 
Leading scholars in the area of Islamic Finance have declared that guarantees made by 
institutions that customers will receive a set rate of return without having to incur losses 
are illegal and unethical. Yet, not only are financial institutions continuing the practice 
but government agencies in Muslim countries are also offering investment 
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opportunities with guaranteed profits. Considering that the Muslim governments are 
responsible for supervising the system in order to combat the illegal practices of 
financial institutions, by offering guaranteed returns the governments are seen to be 
condoning the behaviour of the financial institutions. 
 
Although these actions may help Islamic Banks grow in the short-run, the long-term 
costs (harm to reputation and authenticity) will outweigh the benefits. Such moves also 
provide ammunition to the critics of the system who are already questioning whether 
the system is nothing more than an interest-based system operating under the guise of 
profit.
27
 
 
CONCLUSION 
As competition intensifies, financial institutions increasingly must be able to deliver 
personalized and customized financial solutions. Therefore, it is important for 
institutions to understand the dynamics of customer segmentation, build customer 
relationships and address requirements and preferences of specific segments of the 
market. 
 
It is therefore important that financial institutions invest in new products to meet Islamic 
customer needs and demands. Equally important is the need to develop an effective 
communication plan that goes beyond just marketing and advertisement. As the results 
of this study show, institutions also need to educate customers to adapt to the new ways 
of doing banking transactions, and understanding that Islamic finance involves the 
sharing of both profits and losses. 
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FOOTNOTES 
i 
Shari’ah refers to Islamic law, which is based on the teachings of the Quran. 
ii 
Halal: Products that fulfill the criteria laid out by Islam of being acceptable for use. 
iii 
The 3 administrators were practicing members of the Adelaide Muslim community. The 
administrators were experienced in administering surveys, and were provided information on Islamic 
finance. 
